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Securing Elections Through International Law: A Tool for
Combatting Disinformation Operations?
Abstract
According to the U.S. Department of Justice, in 2014, the Russian government-connected
Internet Research Agency (IRA) initiated an information operation on social media
platforms to manipulate the U.S. population concerning the 2016 U.S. presidential
elections. This has revealed that social media platforms enable the spread of fake news
among the masses globally and can thus become a means of disrupting the electoral
process for foreign actors. This article addresses state-sponsored disinformation operations
on social media that target foreign voters. It considers it crucial to counter such operations
to protect the security and integrity of the elections in the digital age, which is a vital
national interest. Despite some mitigation efforts given after 2016, social media platforms
continued to be exploited by the States seeking to influence the outcome of foreign
elections through the dissemination of false information. This article argues that
international law could play an essential role in combating state-sponsored disinformation
operations. In this regard, it elaborates on sovereignty and non-intervention principles, and
the right to self-determination.
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Introduction
Foreign election interference is not a new phenomenon. States have
always sought to interfere in each other's internal affairs and affect
foreign elections in their interests.1 However, using cyber means for
election interference is relatively new. Though cyber operations against
foreign elections vary and may even directly affect vote tallying,
operations have succeeded the most “by influencing the way voters
think.”2 While disseminating disinformation to manipulate public
opinion, hostile states take “sophisticated advantage of social media.”3
Although foreign states have exposed the electorate to lies since the
invention of the printing press, the channel through which they have
disseminated false information has changed over time.4 Following the
rise of the Internet and new technologies, online news sources, mainly
social media, have replaced traditional media (the radio, television,
printed newspapers, and news magazines).5 Given the global reach of
social platforms, the speed, and the diverse interaction methods
available for users, such as likes, reposts, or comments, it is now easier
than ever to spread information, including inaccurate information.6
Combined with bots, social media has exponentially boosted the
dissemination of false information and facilitated covert disinformation
operations aimed at a foreign electorate.
Actors concerned with the problem of false news and information
dissemination via social media have adopted several solutions to
counter it. The European Union set out some objectives, including
raising awareness, enhancing media literacy, and inciting social
platforms to self-regulation.7 Social platforms adopted flagging, content
removal, and user suspension policies.8 States took steps to regulate
the issue through their national legislation.9 However, the solutions
have proven to be insufficient for several reasons. Awareness raising
gives results in the long term and does not deter perpetrators. Social
platforms’ community policies are susceptible to being abused and
infringing on users’ freedom of expression.10 Furthermore, factchecking systems that social platforms use are insufficient and not
trustworthy to detect all malicious shares when millions of
synchronized bots automate the creation of accounts and false
content.11 Lastly, these community standards do not offer a remedy for
states whose population already encountered disinformation that
remained accessible until the platform removed it. National laws may
serve to punish hostile operators on social media; however, domestic
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rules do not apply outside of the target state’s jurisdiction.
Therefore,national legislations are useless when foreign actors conduct
disinformation operations from a remote location, which is the case in
many cyber operations.
As existing measures are inadequate to prevent states from interfering
in elections in other states, the international community looks for a way
to hold these states accountable and create a deterrent effect for
potential future acts. For instance, French President Emmanuel
Macron has recently stated that election misinformation poses a threat
to democracy and has argued that those responsible for spreading "fake
news" online should be held accountable and possibly brought to
justice.12 Furthermore, in this information age, where some states
recognize information warfare, concerned states should seek a solution
to protect their election security in the face of the risk of interstate
disinformation operations.13 The authors of this article contend that
international law contains three rules applicable to online
disinformation operations conducted or sponsored by foreign states.
Invoking responsibility of foreing states for violating these rules is a
way of combatting such operations. As a corollary of responsibility, the
wrongdoer state must cease its internationally wrongful act and ensure
appropriate assurances and guarantees of non-repetition (if the
operation continues); it must make full reparation (if the operation
finished and caused harm to the target state).14 Additionally, the target
state can take a countermeasure against the wrongdoer state without
violating international law.15 For example, it may initiate a counter
cyber operation to disable the former operation. Moreover, a state
breaching international law loses its credibility in the international
order. These various measures not only provide an ex post remedy for
what has already happened but also prevent future malicious acts as
states planning to operate do not want to face these consequences later.
States facing online disinformation operations have been reluctant to
apply international law in this context so far.16 The lack of a new legal
framework specific to disinformation operations and the ambiguity
about the application of time-honored customary rules of international
law in this new cyber context may be one of the reasons for states’
reluctance. To disambiguate applicable rules of international law to
foreign states’ disinformation operations targeting elections, the
authors of this article elaborate on the concept of disinformation and
identifies three rules of international law that the phenomenon of
disinformation possibly breach. They then assess the legality of these
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operations in light of three existing rules of international law by
redefining the scope of these rules: The principle of sovereignty, the
prohibition of intervention, and the right to self-determination.

Disinformation Operations
Disinformation operations are a subset of the broader notion of
influence operations. Disinformation operations are meant to
disseminate “verifiably false or misleading information that is created,
presented and disseminated for economic gain or to intentionally
deceive the public, and may cause public harm.”17 By spreading false
information and news, disinformation operators aim to alter public
opinion about the issues of public importance, such as health, security,
and especially politics.18 Therefore, an influence operation appear as a
disinformation operation only if the operators deliberately expose the
target audience to falsehood.19 For example, Russian attempt to
interfere in the 2019 U.K. elections by leaking documents on United
States-United Kingdom trade discussions may have influenced public
opinion but does not qualify as a disinformation operation, because the
objective of the alleged operation was to place information into the
public domain.20 An influence operation may also aim to disseminate
malinformation or misinformation, two terms which Wardle and
Derakhshan defined and grouped with disinformation under the
umbrella concept of information disorder.21 Malinformation is
“information that is based on reality, used to inflict harm on a person,
organization or country.” 22 Misinformation is “information that is
false, but not created with the intention of causing harm.” 23 However,
unlike malinformation and misinformation, disinformation operations
rely on falsehood and cause intentional harm.
“The use of lying as a persuasion technique” is also what distinguishes a
disinformation operation conducted in electoral settings from covert
political campaigns, black propaganda, or opposition research.24
Although they all seek to discredit an adversary and change the voting
behavior of the target population, disinformation operations are
destined for deceiving people with false information. However, others
can develop on truthful information. Therefore, many authorities
consider disinformation operations detrimental to the democratic
process, including the public trust in institutions and the participation
of well-informed citizens in fair and free public debate.25 Consequently,
as this article’s focus is state sponsored disinformation operations
targeting foreign elections, it only concerns information operations
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where a foreign state intentionally disseminates verifiably false
information to mislead the electorate.

The Principle of Sovereignty
Confronted with the question of election interference, most scholars
and international lawyers first look at it through the lens of the
principle of sovereignty.26 It is understandable since sovereignty lies at
the heart of modern international law and order.27 However, the idea of
the application of the sovereignty principle concerning election
interference raised two main issues in the literature.
The first issue is whether sovereignty is a rule of international law
giving rise to a legal obligation in cyberspace that states must follow
and, therefore, can violate. A vast majority of scholars and states think
that sovereignty is a separate binding rule of international law that
states shall respect in cyberspace.28 The experts who prepared the
Tallinn Manual 2.0 and the United Nations Group of Governmental
Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and
Telecommunications also took this view.29 However, the United
Kingdom has recently taken the opposite position that the sovereignty
principle in itself does not impose an obligation; it just forms the basis
for many rules of international law that establish an international
obligation.30
The second issue is whether disinformation operations fall under the
scope of the sovereignty principle, assuming it is a separate rule of
international law. Scholars have discussed if a disinformation
operation could violate this rule. In the Tallinn Manual, the experts
establish two grounds for the violation of sovereignty: First, the
infringement of a target state’s territorial integrity and, second, the
interference with or usurpation of inherently governmental functions.31
The violation of territorial integrity naturally requires a physical act on
the target state’s territory. Nevertheless, this is not usually the case
with disinformation operations on social media, as it was not in the
Russian interference in the 2016 elections.32 The Tallinn Manual
broadens this traditional approach and assumes that remotely
conducted cyber operations may also constitute a violation of territorial
integrity if they cause physical damage on the territory of the target
state.33 However, disinformation operations do not usually have such
physical effects either, as their effects are primarily cognitive.34
109
https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol15/iss4/6
DOI: https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.15.4.2033

I?IK et al.: Securing Elections Through International Law

Therefore, according to scholars, this ground does not explain why
disinformation operations could violate the sovereignty principle.
The notion of interference with or usurpation of an inherently
governmental function is not always clear.35 An inherently
governmental function is a function that a state has the exclusive right
to perform or decide on its performance.36 It is undisputed that the
conduct of elections is one of the inherent functions of government.37
However, what sort of acts interfere with or usurp a state’s function to
conduct elections is unclear. Scholars have cited various scenarios as
examples. For instance, hacking and disabling voting machines or
altering the vote tally would cause usurpation.38 Accordingly, there
seems to be a consensus that the usurpation of an inherently
governmental function arises when the intervening state’s cyber
operation has a tangible impact on the target state. Similarly, in Tallinn
Manual, the experts concluded that “changing or deleting data such
that it interferes with, the conduct of elections,” constitutes a
usurpation of governmental function and, therefore, a violation of
sovereignty.39 Consequently, scholars tend to look for a tangible impact
on the target state’s ability to conduct elections. Given the abstract
nature of disinformation campaigns, which have purely cognitive
effects, the predominant approach is that such operations do not affect
a state’s ability to hold an election and therefore do not constitute a
usurpation of its governmental function.40
Assessment of the Principle of Sovereignty
The authors of this article side with the prevailing views among
scholars that the sovereignty principle in itself puts an international
obligation over states and that disinformation campaigns, in principle,
do not breach territorial integrity. Nevertheless, they argue that such
operations would interfere with an inherently governmental function,
namely the conduct of elections because a state’s responsibility in
holding an election is not just ensuring its realization. Providing a
sound environment before an election where voters can participate in a
free political debate without being manipulated by foreign powers is
also an inherently governmental function. Michael Schmitt makes a
similar point by claiming that “having access to reliable information
about candidates or issues would seem essential to ensuring the
election is meaningful.”41 Otherwise, it would mean that if voters are
physically able to cast their ballots and the state can correctly count the
votes, the state has fulfilled all of its responsibilities and functions in
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connection with an election, even if some voters were threatened to
vote in a certain way. For instance, in the 2014 Crimean referendum,
even though Crimeans could cast their ballots, many countries saw the
referendum as invalid and in violation of international law because,
alongside other reasons, it took place while Russia was holding sway on
the ground.42 People could vote, but many of those who did not support
joining Russia felt threatened and could not sincerely express their will
at the ballot box.43 This example clearly shows that an election’s mere
existence is insufficient to render it valid under international law. It is
also crucial to provide an environment where voters are free to decide
which way to vote.
A disinformation operation not threatening but manipulating voters
serves a similar outcome. In the 2016 U.S. election, for example, Russia
spread fabricated lies on social media platforms to manipulate
American people into voting in a certain way that they would not have
voted if Russia had not intervened. It is similar to the Crimeans, who
would not have voted for secession if they had not felt threatened by
the Russian presence. Both the Russian presence in Crimea in 2014 and
the Russian-backed disinformation on social media in 2016 aimed to
ensure that these elections’ outcomes were in line with the Russian will.
However, since the effect of threats or disinformation on voters is
cognitive and, therefore, a person cannot measure it empirically, it is
not possible to draw a firm conclusion that Russia indeed shaped the
outcome of these elections. For example, it cannot be determined with
certainty how many Crimeans voted for secession or did not even go to
the polls just because they felt threatened by the Russian presence.
Nevertheless, many countries still consider this referendum invalid
under international law due to the significant Russian presence on the
ground. Those states’ attitude is in line with the position that
threatening voters per se violates sovereignty, even though it is not
possible to measure the impact of the threats on the electorate.
Similarly, the presence of a considerable disinformation operation
suffices to contravene international law, although one cannot put forth
its effects with certainty.
When a disinformation operation has little scale and effect, the “rule of
reason” should apply.44 If only a few tweets circulate online, it will not
violate the principle of sovereignty, as it has no potential to disrupt the
healthy preelection environment that the targeted state should ensure
for voters. Hence, it falls short of interference with an inherently
governmental function. It is up to the victim state to prove that a
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disinformation campaign of considerable scale and effect took place.45
However, this does not mean that the victim state should prove that the
intervening state, in fact, changed the election’s outcome. For instance,
Department of Justice Special Counsel Robert Mueller reported that
Russia conducted a significant disinformation campaign to alter the
outcome of that election.46 Although the Report has not proved that
Russia’s operation indeed changed the outcome of the 2016
presidential election, it concludes that Russia interfered with the
inherently governmental function of the U.S. government by distorting
the free political environment through disinformation.
Consequently, a state’s governmental function of conducting an
election also includes providing a healthy electoral environment for its
voters. Carrying out a disinformation operation constitutes an
interference with an inherently governmental function, as such
operations prevent the target state from guaranteeing that voters are
free to make their decisions before and during elections. Therefore,
foreign disinformation operations on social media violate the target
state’s sovereignty.

The Principle of Non-Intervention
Another international obligation that a state intervening in a foreign
election through a disinformation campaign potentially breaches is the
principle of non-intervention. Unlike sovereignty, the status of nonintervention as a customary rule of international law is
uncontentious.47 For a disinformation operation to constitute a
violation of the non-intervention principle, two elements must be
satisfied: The operation must concern the target state’s domaine
réservé, and it must be coercive.48
The meaning and scope of the term domaine réservé are ambiguous.49
The International Court of Justice has concluded that a prohibited
intervention must be on “matters in which each state is permitted, by
the principle of state sovereignty to decide freely.”50 The ICJ further
stated that a state’s choice of its political system is a clear example of
domaine réservé.51 Relying on the ICJ’s description of the term,
scholars undisputedly accepted that the conduct of elections falls
within a state’s domaine réservé.52 Therefore, an operation targeting a
foreign election satisfies the first condition of a violation of nonintervention.
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An act that concerns the target state’s domaine réservé must be
coercive to violate non-intervention, as “the element of
coercion…defines, and indeed forms the essence of, prohibited
intervention.”53 However, there is no consensus on the definition of
coercion.54 Accordingly, whether disinformation operations are
coercive is open to dispute. In Tallinn Manual, the experts defined
coercion as an “affirmative act designed to deprive another state of its
freedom of choice, that is, to force that state to act in an involuntary
manner or involuntarily refrain from acting in a particular way.”55 They
further concluded that activities such as “persuasion, criticism, public
diplomacy, propaganda, retribution, mere maliciousness” differs from
coercion as they only influence the actions of the target state or do not
seek any action on its part, whereas coercion involves compelling so the
target state’s actions can no more be considered as voluntary.56 The
Tallinn Manual’s reference to non-intervention confirms the view that a
coercive act must actively compel the target state to behave in a certain
way. Most scholars share the Tallinn Manual’s approach and conclude
that mere disinformation operations do not qualify as coercive because
they do not aim to alter the election outcome forcibly but merely
influence it.57 Under this approach, “the legal requirement of coercion
does not track the size of the operation or its result; it tracks the
method used.”58 A disinformation campaign is not coercive under this
view because it uses methods of influence even if it has empirically
changed the outcome of an election.
Some scholars adopt a broader definition of coercion.59 According to
this view, the physical force exerted on the target state is unnecessary
for an act to qualify as coercive. Instead, a significant impact on that
state’s domaine réservé is sufficient.60 This wider approach makes it
easier to consider a disinformation operation targeting an election as
coercive, as it focuses on whether its effects on the election are
significant instead of the nature of the methods used.61
Consequently, the prevailing view among scholars is that the coercion
element requires that a foreign state force the target state engage in or
refrain from a specific action. Accordingly, disinformation operations
are not coercive as they do not constitute a method through which the
intervening state exerts a force on the target state. However, a less
adopted view of coercion does not require a concrete compulsion of the
target state and therefore allows a broader understanding of the term.
Under this approach, disinformation operations qualify as coercive and
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violate the rule of non-intervention if their impacts on the election are
significant.
Assessment of the Principle of Non-Intervention
The authors of this article agree that those who assess the element of
coercion should take into consideration the method employed in a
disinformation operation. However, they disagree with the prevailing
view that manipulation through disinformation does not constitute a
coercive method. The traditional understanding of coercion refers to a
dictatorial behavior by one state towards another. Oppenheim
famously stated that “to constitute intervention the interference must
be forcible or dictatorial, or otherwise coercive, in effect depriving the
state intervened against of control over the matter in question.”62
However, this understanding of coercion is a narrow approach.63 In
this vein, Damrosch argues that “the traditional formulation of
intervention as ‘dictatorial interference’ resulting in the ‘subordination
of the will’ of one sovereign to another is…unsatisfactory, because some
subtle techniques of political influence may be as effective as cruder
forms of domination.”64 Damrosch's approach has gained importance
over time as methods of intervention have diversified considerably in
the current technological era, while the traditional understanding has
become inadequate in the face of this diversity.
States should adopt a more comprehensive understanding of coercion
to encompass today’s more subtle and covert methods of interference,
such as the dissemination of disinformation. Concerning
disinformation, the criterion for a coercive act should not be its
dictatorial nature but its method of spreading false information to
corrupt the people’s judgment. Various sources expose people to much
information about parties and candidates in the preelection process. By
judging this information, people decide for whom to vote. Every piece
of information they encounter in this judgment process ultimately
impacts their decision-making. Disinformation operations conducted
by foreign states introduce false information to people. Therefore, these
operations prevent people from exercising sound judgment and force
them to decide in a particular direction without realizing it. However,
mere propaganda and information operations do not constitute
coercive methods because they only provide people with accurate
information. In this case, people’s judgment is still sound because all
the information they encounter in the decision-making process is valid.
Their judgment is, thus, not corrupted, unlike people who form their
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decision based on false information presented by the foreign state.
Steven Wheatly recently defended a similar view by arguing that
manipulation through false information constitutes “coercive
manipulation” and therefore breaches the non-intervention principle.65
This conclusion would also be consistent with the Tallinn Manual, as
the method of manipulation through false information distinguishes a
disinformation operation from mere propaganda.
The authors of this article argue that manipulation through false
information, the primary method used by disinformation operations,
falls under the scope of coercion. The fact that such operations target
voters does not mean that they do not influence the will of the state. In
elections, the will of the former shapes the latter’s will since the results
of elections determine the state policies in many areas, such as foreign
policy. Such operations targeting voters, therefore, may constitute
indirect interventions.66 Many scholars would not hesitate to agree that
if Russia imposed a specific policy in its favor on the United States, it
would violate the non-intervention principle. What would be the
difference between dictating a policy to the United States and
manipulating American people who would decide the policymakers
through elections? In the first case, the United States would have to
change its will and act as Russia dictates. In the second case, the United
States would change its will again due to the Russian manipulation of
the American people's will. 67 For instance, while interfering in the 2016
U.S. election, Russia’s goal was to get presidential candidate Donald
Trump elected because it believed this would lead to a more proRussian U.S. foreign policy, which would not have been the case under
Hillary Clinton's presidency.68 By this way, Russia aimed to impose a
policy in its favor on the United States.
Furthermore, even if a coercive disinformation operation fails to
produce the desired outcome, it still constitutes a violation of the nonintervention principle. The experts who wrote the Tallinn Manual also
unanimously asserted whether the attempt of an action that violates
the non-intervention principle succeeded or not is irrelevant.69 For
example, even if the Russian operation had not succeeded in changing
the election outcome according to the will of Russia, the fact that
Russia conducted such an operation still suffices to violate the nonintervention principle. In 2017, for example, Russia conducted a
disinformation operation on the French presidential election to prevent
Emmanuel Macron from becoming the new President.70 Similar to the
2016 U.S. elections, Russia resorted to disinformation because France
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would have had a pro-Russian foreign policy if the presidential
candidate Marine Le Pen had won the elections.71 Notwithstanding that
Russia ultimately failed to ensure the presidency of Marine Le Pen, it
still violated the principle of non-interference as it resorted to coercive
acts concerning a matter that fell within France’s domaine réservé.
Whether the intervening state achieved its objective in spreading
disinformation is thus irrelevant.
While dictatorial acts are a direct method of coercion, a disinformation
operation targeting the electorate constitutes an indirect way of
coercing a state to change its will on an issue that falls within its
sovereignty. 1970 Friendly Relations Declaration, which constitutes a
customary source of international law and is, therefore, binding,
prohibits indirect interventions.72 Accordingly, spreading
disinformation also breaches the non-intervention principle.

The Right to Self-Determination
Another international law concept offered to legally qualify the
disinformation campaigns on social media as unlawful is the principle
of self-determination. It has been an alternative, especially for those
who are in search of an international norm to denounce foreign
election interference but are of the position that disinformation does
not constitute a violation of the principles of non-intervention or
sovereignty.73 However, some scholars doubted the application of selfdetermination for several reasons.
The first doubt that some scholars have had in this regard has been
whether the term “self-determination” applies outside the
decolonization context. Self-determination emerged after the Second
World War as a right assigned to peoples under colonial rule to
“determine their own political fate” by creating a new independent
state.74 Due to this traditional understanding, some scholars today
oppose the idea that this right applies to a group going to the polls to
form a new government.75 From a more contemporary perspective, the
right to self-determination not only entitles dependent peoples on a
colonial territory to independence but also enables an independent
state’s population to “select their own political destiny” within the
existing state.76
Scholars have been of different opinions also about the practical
difficulty of the application of self-determination in the context of
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election interference. According to a doctrinal view, it is hard to prove
that an election resulted differently than it could have resulted due to
the obscurity of how the voters would have voted if fake news did not
mislead them.77 Another doctrinal view also agrees that it is not
possible to empirically prove that an online disinformation campaign
has changed an election outcome.78 However, according to the
supporters of this latter view, the alteration of the outcome is not a
decisive criterion in determining the violation of self-determination.
For instance, Ohlin think the illegitimacy of an influence operation
roots in the deception caused by the covert participation of foreign
state members in a state’s political process and discourse, of which the
opinions of foreigners are not part.79 The covert nature of these
operations, namely disguise of social media users as nationals, conceals
the foreign participation in political debate and deceives the national
population. The notion of self-determination protects the deliberative
process and, therefore, covert disinformation operations on social
platforms violate the target population’s right to self-determination.80
Tsagourias similarly argues that people perform self-determination
only when they form their will and authority freely besides expressing
them freely.81 False information and masquerade of foreign sources as
internal cumulatively undermine this process and prevent people from
making free choices about their own political and economic regime. 82
Assessment of the Right to Self-Determination
The authors of this article argue that the views questioning the
application of the right to self-determination outside the decolonization
context ignore its internal dimension. The self-determination as an
entitlement to independent statehood is called external, whereas it is
called internal when exercised within an existing state through “its own
internal arrangements.”83 Internal self-determination is “implemented
internally, without entitling the people to its own, independent
state.”84 The Human Rights Committee, while monitoring states’
compliance with the ICCPR in their exercise of the right to selfdetermination, evaluates their “constitutional and political
processes.”85 This indicates that “internal self-determination” is
exercised through constitutional and political practices within the
existing state. Moreover, some HRC members had expressly “suggested
that the concept of self-determination was not limited to anticolonial
context.”86
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As to the practical difficulty of applying self-determination in the
context of elections, the authors of this article uphold the view that the
disinformation operation’s influence on the election result is not
determinative in concluding the violation of the right to selfdetermination. In this regard, the authors support Ohlin’s position that
the deception of voters through fake personas who pretend to be
national users on social media violates this right. Even if the personas
masqueraded as citizens shared truthful information on their accounts,
this would still be contrary to self-determination. In other words, a
covert influence operation, not necessarily a disinformation operation,
violates the right to self-determination, as foreign actors engage in the
political debate before elections. However, a state must reserve the
preelection discussion environment only for voters as the election itself.
The dissemination of disinformation, with or without the concealment
of the source of disinformation, violates the right to self-determination
as the concealment alone does. This right entitles voters to establish
their political will in a free environment. Deliberately replacing the truth
with fiction prevents the electoral environment from being free. Unlike
the Tsagourias, the authors argue in this article that the covert nature of
a disinformation operation is not decisive in concluding that it
contravenes self-determination. Disinformation diffused on media
platforms by fake accounts and authentic accounts do not differ in the
sense that they both undermine the deliberative process prior to
elections. To illustrate, even if Russia had not concealed the fact that the
posts shared on Twitter in 2016 originated from Russia, it would have
violated the self-determination of the American people. Both
dissemination of disinformation and concealment of the source of
information pollute the information environment where the electorate
shapes its will about its political destiny. Therefore, they both hinder the
exercise of the right to self-determination.

Conclusion
Dissemination of false information about foreign elections through
social media has recently become an issue that policymakers,
practitioners, and scholars seek to counter due to the growing threat it
constitutes to democracy. The solutions proposed to date have yet to be
sufficient to thoroughly tackle the problem of spreading disinformation
by foreign states through digital information and communication
channels. The authors of this article propose that a state that an
operation has harmed or has put it in danger of suffering harm should
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invoke the violation of international law. Suppose the international
community concludes that the state behind an information operation
has violated its obligations arising from international law. In that case,
this state will have to bear the consequences of its responsibility under
international law. A summary of these consequences is: The
responsible state is under obligation to terminate the disinformation
operation, provide guarantees of non-repetition, fully compensate the
target state’s damages, and endure the countermeasures it faces.
Therefore, invoking responsibility under international law prevents the
impunity of the wrongdoer states and provides deterrence for future
malign attempts.
As to the rules of international law regulating the issue of electoral
disinformation online, there exist three distinct norms at the disposal
of victim states. First, a disinformation operation violates the principle
of sovereignty because it interferes with an inherently governmental
function, namely the proper conduct of elections. It distorts the
election environment where the electorate can form its mind without
any manipulating source of information. Secondly, it breaches the
prohibition on intervention because the method used in disinformation
operations, namely manipulation through false information, corrupts
the judgment of the electorate and thus indirectly alters the target
state’s essential will. Thirdly, it infringes on the right to selfdetermination of the target state’s population since people cannot
freely form their collective will to determine their political destiny
when surrounded by fake news. Although these rules do not directly
regulate electoral disinformation, states can apply them in this context
since they are fundamental principles of international law and
sovereign states acknowledge them as binding. Hence, there is no need
to establish new rules to combat disinformation through international
law.
In international law, terms, rules, and principles have the meaning
given to them by the international community. In other words, the
approaches of states, international organizations, tribunals, courts,
scholars, and international law practitioners will determine the
meaning and scope of the principles of sovereignty, non-intervention,
and self-determination. Therefore, the answer to whether
disinformation operations targeting elections violate any of these three
rules will get clear only if states publicly express their views on this
issue and explain how they accept the scope and meaning of these
rules. The authors of this article encourage states to reach a consensus
119
https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol15/iss4/6
DOI: https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.15.4.2033

I?IK et al.: Securing Elections Through International Law

on the application of these rules to the cases of electoral disinformation
operations and offer plausible approaches to each of the principles of
sovereignty, non-intervention, and self-determination to guide how the
international community should understand the scope of these rules
while applying them in electoral interference context. The authors
conclude that if states adopt these approaches, they can effectively
combat foreign disinformation operations targeting elections through
international law.
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